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Two themes have dominated the debate on corporate tax reform inrecent
years. First, there is a widespread perception that the cumulative effect
of piecemeal changes to the tax system has been toproduce major
distortions in the pattern of savings and investment.The magnitude of
these distortions has recently been documented in King and Fullerton
(1984). As a result the goal of "fiscal neutrality" has attracted a good
deal of support. Secondly, there has been growing concern over thesteady
erosion of revenues accruing to the government from the corporate sector.
The practical expression of these perceptions has been the elimination
of many concessions to investment and savings particularly at thecorporate
level.This can be seen most clearly in the major overhaul of the
corporate tax system that occurred in the UK in 1984, (the transition to
which was completed in April 1986) and in the US Treasury proposals in both
their original November 1984 and subsequent May 1985 versions (henceforth
Treasury I and Treasury II respectively). Throughout the post-war period
governments of various persuasions have attempted to stimulate capital
formation by offering investment incentives of increasing generosity.
These have taken the form of cash grants, credits against tax liabilities,
or straightforward tax allowances. But the concessions were introduced in
an ad hoc fashion and by the late 1970's the resulting pattern of
incentives was difficult to justify in terms of any rational view of the
optimal taxation of savings.Effective tax rates on investment projects
varied enormously from one type of project to another (King and Fullerton,
1984). In response to these problems both the US and UK proposals were an
attempt to move toward fiscal neutrality by adopting a tax base that could-2-
more accurately be described as a measure of economic income. Many of the
concessions to investment were eliminated in return for a cut in the
corporate tax rate.
The recent debate on tax reform in the US and UK shows that the attempt
to return to a comprehensive income tax raises at least as many questions
as it answers. The calculation of economic depreciation of an asset, and
the measures that are required to index the corporate tax system for
inflation, are very difficult to implement in practice. It is appropriate,
therefore, to ask whether there is an alternative way to attain the
objective of fiscal neutrality without a significant erosion of the tax
base.
In this paper we discuss such an alternative. It is called the cash
flow corporate income tax.The basic principle behind the idea is that
the company is taxed on the net cash flow received from its real business
activities. No distinction is made between capital and income in the
calculation of a company's tax base. By basing the tax on cash flow the
measurement of economic income is removed from the concern of the tax
authorities.Such a system achieves fiscal neutrality by harmonising
investment incentives on a common basis, namely immediate expensing of all
investment expenditure. The incentive to invest with such a tax is greater
than would be the case under either Treasury I or Treasury II plans, and
also under the new UK corporate tax system.The motivation for the cash
flow tax is to apply the principles of a consumption or expenditure tax to
the corporate sector. The idea is not new and can be traced back at least
as far as Brown (1948) and its practical implementation was discussed in
King (1975), Kay and King (1978), Meade Committee (1978), and Aaron and
Galper (1985).- 3-
There are three parts to the paper.First, Section 2 describes the
principles of a cash flow corporate income tax and explains how it would
work. The second part analyses the effects of the corporate cash flow tax
on the firm's choice of financial policy and its debt-equity mix, and also
upon the cost of capital facing the company when making investment
decisions. Financial policy is analysed in section 3 and section 4
discusses the impact of the tax on the cost of capital to a firm and the
effective tax rate on an investment project. Attention will be focussed on
three issues that have received rather little attention in previous
discussions. First, the nature of any problems that arise from the
interaction between a cash flow tax at the corporate level and an income
tax at the personal level. Secondly, the incidence of the corporate cash
flow tax depends upon the marginal source of finance to the representative
company, and the identification of the marginal source of funds requires a
general equilibrium model of the corporate sector's capital structure.
Thirdly, the corporate cash flow tax illustrates vividly the potential for
dynamic inconsistency in government fiscal policy.
The final part of the paper, Section 5, discusses some of the more
practical problems that would arise if the cash flow corporate income tax
were to be implemented. These include (i) transitional arrangements, (ii)
international considerations, and (iii) the likely revenue consequences of
a change in the tax base.
2. A CASHFLOWCORPORATEINCOME TAX
Recentresearchhas shown that the corporate income tax introduces
anumber of distortions into savings and investmentdecisions. To
eliminatethese one might eithermove to a more neutral tax base or
eliminate the separate tax cn corporations altogether. The latter-4-
course would have many attractions were it not for the following two
considerations.First, a corporate income tax exists already, and to
abolish it would be to yield windfall capital gains to the current owners
of corporate equity. There is truth in the well-known adage that "an old
tax is a good tax". Secondly, in the absence of a tax on corporate income
it may be difficult to tax the capital income received by foreign investors
in domestic companies or domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations.
The cash flow corporate income tax represents an attempt to design a
tax that is neutral with respect to both financial and investment
decisions, and at the same time continues to yield the government positive
revenue from past investments, from profits in excess of the normal rate of
return, and also from activities financed by overseas investors.It is
attractive for a further reason, namely that the base of the tax requires
no adjustment for inflation, and hence that the complicated indexation
provisions for depreciation, for example, required under alternative
corporate tax systems are unnecessary with a cash flow tax.This is
because the tax is based on the sources and uses of funds statement and not
the profit and loss account. The tax eliminates the necessity of
calculating "economic profit". Hence there is no need to construct a true
measure of depreciation nor to make any adjustment for the effects of
inflation.
The basic principle of the tax is to levy a charge on the net cash flow
to the company resulting from its real economic activities.The tax base
can be measured as the difference between the receipts from sales of goods
and services and the purchases of all real goods and services required in
the production process, including purchases of capital goods. At the same
time the tax base would disallow any deduction for the financing of the
investment.Hence there would be no deductibility of either interest
payments nor dividends. The major departures from the present system-5-
would be the granting of immediate expensing (100per cent first year
depreciation allowances) to all forms of investment (but given this there
would be no need for an investment tax credit),and interest payments
would no longer qualify as a deduction for thepurposes of the corporate
income tax.Moreover, there would be no room for dividend deduction
schemes of the type proposed in the recent Treasury plans.In practice,
there would need to be transitional arrangements toprevent both undue
hardship and also tax avoidance during the transition from the current
system to a new cash flow tax base. These, and other practical questions to
which satisfactory answers must be provided before the tax could be
implemented, are discussed further in Section 5 below.
The nature of double entry book-keeping means that the totalsources of
funds to a company are identical to its total uses of funds. Animportant
implication of this identity is that the base of the cash flow tax can be
described in either of two ways. The first is the difference between sales
and purchases; the net cash flow from real economicactivity. The second
is the diffference between dividends paid to shareholders and issues ofnew
shares.
The former may be described as the corporate cash flow base and the
latter as the net equity distributions base.To see the relationship
between the two examine the corporate sources and uses of funds shown in
Table 1.In terms of the notation of Table 1 the two tax bases, denoted by
TB1 and TB2 respectively, are given by the equations
TB1=R -I (2.1)
TB2D -S (2.2)-6-
From the flow of funds identity it follows that
TB2 +TTB1 +(B-P) (2.3)
The twodifferences between the corporate cash flow and net equity
distributions bases can be seen to be the following. First, because taxes
paid enter into the sources and uses of funds statement, the corporate cash
flow basis is a measure of the tax base on a tax-inclusive basis, whereas
the definition in terms of net equity distributions is measured on a
tax-exclusive basis. If the tax rate on the corporate cash flow base were
fifty per cent, then this would be equivalent to a tax rate of 100 per cent
on the net equity distributions base.Secondly, to the extent that a
cornpany earns real profits from transactions in financial assets (other
than equities), then the corporate cash flow base would not include those
profits. Only if the net equity distributions base were used would such
profits be taxed. This is a major consideration for financial
institutions, such as banks, which derive their earnings primarily from the
provision of financial services for which no direct charge is levied but
which are reflected in differences between borrowing and lending rates.
The same phenomenon can be observed in the national accounts in which the
real economic profits of the financial sector are recorded as negative.
This is because the national accounts use real transactions to measure
profits and ignore profits on financial transactions. If no profit is made
on such financial transactions then the present value of interestpayments
equals the present value of net borrowing, and over time, and given a
constant tax rate, the corporate cash flow base and the net equity-7-
distributions base are identical. This is likely to be approximately true
for major industrial corporations, and as far as nonfinancial activity is
concerned the two bases have identical economic effects.It will prove
convenient to analyse these effects in terms of the corporate cash flow
base because this may more readily be compared with the existing base and
with reforms that have been proposed.The two bases could be made
identically equal by modifying the corporate cash flow base to include the
difference between net new borrowing and net interestpayments.In other
words, interest deductibility would continue but new borrowing would
constitute a taxable receipt. It is clear from equation (2.3) that the
amended corporate cash flow base must in all circumstances be identical to
the net equity distributions base except for the fact that the former is
tax-inclusive and the latter tax-exclusive. The tax-exclusive rate,t2, is
related to the tax-inclusive rate, t1, by the equation
tl
(2.4)
Apart from the treatment of profits on financial transactions, there is
a difference between the corporate cash flow base and the net equity
distributions base in terms of the transitional problems that might arise
in attempting to move from the present system toward a cash flow tax. Some
of these practical issues are taken up in Section 5. But we turn first to
an analysis of the long-run effects of the cash flow corporate income tax
on the optimal financial and investment policy of a company once the tax is
in place, and we contrast these effects with those that would follow from-8-
the adoption of alternative tax bases such as those proposed in the recent
Treasury plans.
3. FINANCIAL POLICY AND ThE DEBT -EQUITYMIX
It is well known that the current US corporate income tax affords a tax
advantage to debt rather than equity, because of the deductibility of
interest payments, and discriminates in favour of internal equity finance
(retained earnings) and against the issue of new shares. The rationale for
this pattern of incentives is unclear. A thriving equity market,
particularly for new risk capital, provides one of the main routes by which
household savings are channelled into corporate investment. It is perhaps
not surprising, therefore, that there have been frequent proposals to
relieve the double taxation of dividends inherent in the present system.
The most recent were the Treasury I and Treasury II plans, both of which
advocated a partial dividend deduction.In this section we contrast the
incentives to use debt and equity that are implied by a cash flow tax on
the one hand, and alternative reforms, such as the Treasury dividend
deduction proposal, on the other.
To do this we first analyse the effects of different taxes on a
company's choice of financial policy in general, and then apply the results
to particular systems of company taxation.Both personal and corporate
taxes are relevant to the choice of debt-equity mix.Two personal tax
rates are distinguished here, the marginal income tax of investors, denoted
by m, and the effective tax rate on accrued capital gains, denoted by z.-9-
Differences in tax rates among investors will be discussed below.Because
capital gains tax is charged on gains only when they are realised, the
effective tax rate on accrued gains is significantly lower than thenominal
statutory rate.In addition, it has been argued that theability to
exploit the short term -longterm gains distinction further erodes the
effective rate and may possibly lead to a negative effectivetax rate. For
our purposes we note solely that the value of z is bounded aboveby the
statutory rate.
Three corporate tax variables are relevant to the analysis. Theseare
the rate of tax on taxable profits that would be paid if noprofits were
distributed, denoted by r, the opportunity cost of retained earnings in
terms of gross (i.e. pre-income tax) dividends, foregone, denotedby 0, and
the fraction of interest payments that are tax-deductible, denotedby 3.
The value ofmeasures the rate at which cash in the company's hands may
be transformed into cash in the hands of the stockholders (Feldstein1970,
King 1971, 1977). Under the current US tax system a transfer of a dollar
from the company to the shareholders produces agross dividend of one
dollar. Hence equals unity.With alternative tax systems, such as a
dividend deduction scheme or the imputation system employed in most EEC
countries, the value of generally exceeds unity to reflect the credit
given to the shareholders, explicitly or implicitly, for taxes already paid
at the corporate level.To evaluate 0 under different tax regimes it is
helpful to define the total tax liability of the company, denoted by T, as
the total taxes paid by the company and stockholders together less the
income tax on dividends and capital gains tax paid by the stockholders.




where Y is taxable corporate income and G is total gross dividends. From
the definition of 0 the extra taxes (minus the credits) that result from a
distribution are (l-)/ per unit of gross dividends.
We may now contrast (3.1) with the formulae that describe the operation
of various tax regimes.Under the current US system the corporate tax
liability is simply
T =cY (3.2)
where c is the rate of corporate income tax.
Equating coefficients in (3.1) and (3.2) confirms that r =cand
=1.0.
Under the imputation system used widely in Europe part of the corporate
tax liability is credited against the shareholders' income tax liability on
dividends.In effect, the company is deemed to have paid income tax on
behalf of the shareholders at some rate which is described as the rate of







The gross dividend received by the stockholder is equal to the cash
dividend payment made by the company grossed up by the rate of imputation.- 11-
TheTreasury plans proposed that a fraction of dividends be deductible
for the purposes of the corporate income tax.Denote the fraction of
dividends that are deductible by X.In Treasury I X was 0.5 and in









From this it can be seen that in terms of economic effects the dividend
deduction proposed is equivalent to an imputation system with a rate of
imputation equal to the product of the corporate tax rate and the fraction
of dividends that is deductible. There are two points to note about this.
First, a change in the corporate tax rate will automatically change the
effective rate of imputation unless a compensating change in X is made.
Secondly, the effective rate of imputation is very sensitive to the value
of X.For example, in the Treasury I plan, with a corporate tax rate of
33% and X =0.5,the effective imputation rate is 16.5%.Under the
Treasury II proposals, with the same corporate tax rate but X =0.1,the
effective imputation rate is only 3.3%. Moreover, both values are low when
compared with imputation rates in Europe. In the UK, for example, the rate
of imputation is 30% (from April 1986, 29%).
The cash flow tax is a variant of the classical system of corporate
income taxation which is that currently used in the US. The value of 0 in
both cases is unity. The major difference between the cash flow tax and- 12-
thepresent system lies in the treatment of debt finance. With a cash flow
tax interest payments are not deductible for corporate income tax purposes
(or, equivalently, borrowing is a taxable receipt). Debt finance would be
less attractive than at present.
The incentive to use different sources of finance can be seen from the
following pairwise comparisons between debt finance, retained earnings and
new share issues. In each case we compare the net of tax income that could
be distributed out of one unit of corporate profits corresponding to the
differing methods of remunerating investors implied by the different
sources of finance.The results are simply stated below; derivations may
be found in King (1977, 1986). At this stage we ignore indexation of the
tax system.
(i) debt finance is preferred to retained earnings if
(1-rn) (l-z)(1-3r) (3.7)
(ii) debt finance is preferred to new share issues if
1 (l-f3r) (3.8)
(iii) retained earnings are preferred to new share issues if
(l-z) >(1-m)' (3.9)
From these equations it is clear that with a cash flowcorporate income
tax there would be fiscal neutrality between debt finance andnew equity
issues (from 3.8) .Retainedearnings would be the most attractive source- 13-
offinance for taxable investors, and financialpolicy would be a matter of
complete indifference for tax-exempt investors such aspension funds.
Neutrality could be achieved for all investors by either taxingcapital
gains at income tax rates or adopting a consumption tax treatment of
household capital income.Under the current US tax code debt finance
dominates new share issues, and for almost all investors debt finance also
dominates retained earnings. With the dividend deductionproposal of the
Treasury plans the condition for debt finance to be more attractive than
new equity issues is (from 3.8)
!3 >X (3.10)
Only if the rate at which dividends may be deducted exceeds the
proportion of interest payments that is deductible will new share issues
dominate debt finance. The Treasury plan envisaged retaining full
deductibility of interest (3l) and values for X of 0.5 and 0.1 for
Treasury I and Treasury II respectively. Under these proposals debt
finance would retain its tax advantage. Moreover, the effective imputation
rate would be independent of the tax rate of the investor and so neutrality
between internal and external equity finance would be impossible to
achieve.
It has long been argued in the US that partial integration of the
corporate and personal income taxes, as far as dividends are concerned,
would alleviate much of the discrimination against equity inherent in the
current system. But partial measures of this type do not deal adequately
with the substantial spread among marginal investor tax rates. Indeed, the
imputation system in Britain has been criticised by the employers'
federation (CBI, 1985, p.69) on precisely these grounds.- 14-
"Itis clear that the 1986 system ..willfor a majority of
shareholders, provide either a strong bias in favour of distribution or
indifference as between distribution and retention ..the1986 system will
in time produce broadly two types of company:
a)Typical quoted companies with mainly institutional or basic rate
taxpayer shareholders, which will make very full dividend payments
b) Companies with largely top rate taxpayer shareholders, making
minimal distributions.
The Exchequer will of course lose substantially as a result of this".
The conclusion reached by the CBI's Tax Reform Working Party was that
Britain should adopt a cash flow corporation tax.
SECTION 4 THE COST OF CAPITAL
The principle aim of the cash flow corporate income tax is to avoid
distortion of investment decisions by ensuring that the cost of capital is
independent of the particular investment project under consideration.By
the cost of capital is meant here the pre-tax rate of return net of
decpreciation that is rquired on a project in order to call forth the funds
needed to finance it. It is the financial rather than the user cost of
capital (the latter includes also the return necessary to finance
depreciation of the asset).
To illustrate the effect of the cash flow tax, and of other possible
reforms, on the cost of capital we consider the simple case in which true
economic depreciation occurs at the nonstochastic exponential rate &.With






where f1 —proportionof investment expenditure that qualifies for ordinary
depreciation allowances.
proportion of investment expenditure that receives cash flow tax
treatment (i.e. immediate expensing)
—proportionof investment expenditure that qualifies for a cash
grant or investment tax credit.
AD —presentvalue of tax savings from ordinary depreciation
allowances.
g —rateof cash grant or equivalent rate of investment tax credit
p —rateat which company discounts net of corporate tax cash flows
6 —exponentialrate of true economic depreciation
—rateof increase of price of investment goods.
Equation (4.1) states that the required pre-tax real rate of return on
a project, adjusted for depreciation, is equal to the real rate of return
that must be offered to the suppliers of finance grossed up by the
corporate tax rate and multipled by the effective price of a new asset.
The latter is the market price less the present value of the tax allowances
for depreciation and other investment incentives. Indexation of
depreciation allowances lowers the effective price of capital goods.For
simplicity of exposition (4.1) omits corporate wealth taxes and the
taxation of the inflationary component of inventory profits. A treatment
of these issues may be found in King and Fullerton (1984) and King (1986).- 16-
Thevalue of the rate at which the company discounts net of corporate
tax cash flows, denoted by p, depends upon the source of finance used for
the project and upon the identity of the marginal investor. It depends also
upon the indexation provisions of the tax code.In a partial equilibrium
model in which all investors have identical tax rates the following are the
relevant expressions for the corporate discount rate for each source of
finance (see appendix for the derivations). The nominal interest rate in
economy is denoted by i.
(i)debt finance pi(l-r) + 3T1rI (4.2)
ml. -zI ." 1 Z (ii) new share issues p =i/O+ ,. (4.3)
(1-m)O
1-rn ml. -zI
(iii) retained earnings pi —+ 1 Z
(44)
l-z l-z
where I and I are dummy variables that take the value unity when interest
payments and capital gains, respectively, are fully indexed for tax
purposes, and are zero in the absence of indexation.
Partial equilibrium expressions for the cost of capital corresponding
to the different sources of finance can be derived by substituting the
appropriate values for the corporate discount rate into equation (4.1). In
a general equilibrium model, however, we would expect that the discount
rates would be equal for all sources of finance employed by the firm, and- 17-
thedifficulty in constructing convincing general equilibrium models isto
imagine plausible mechanisms by which the marginal discount ratesare
brought into equality. One such model is the Miller equilibrium (Miller
1977) in which investors face constraints on short sales of allassets. In
this equilibrium the constraints are binding on all investorsexcept those
who are indifferent between equity and debt finance as faras taxes are
concerned.The marginal investor is the unconstrained investor, and the
company, which itself faces no constraints on its financial policy, is
indifferent at the margin between debt and equity finance. For the
marginal investor the cost of equity finance is equal to that of debt
finance and the income tax rate of the marginal investor is such that the
discount rate given by equations (4.2) and (4.4) are equal. Hence from the
tax point of view this is equivalent to calculating the cost of capital as
if the firm financed marginal projects by debt finance.In such an
equilibrium it is easy to evaluate the effects of different tax regimes on
the cost of capital and hence the optimal level of investment. In thecase
of the cash flow corporate income tax, interest payments are not deductible
for tax purposes (f3 —0)and there are no indexation provisions.The
corporate discount rate is from (4.2) simply the nominal interest rate. In
addition, all investment expenditure can be immediately expensed (f2l,
f1—f3—O) and hence from equation (4.1) the cost of capital is given by the
following expression
c i - r (4.5)
In other words, the cost of capital is equal to the real interest rate.
The rates of tax, both at the personal and corporate level, have no effect
on the relationship between the market interest rate and the required rate- 18-
ofreturn on investment projects.The decision rule that a firm uses in
the presence of taxes is identical to the rule that it would use in the
absence of taxes. The existence of a cash flow corporate income tax does
not distort the investment decision.
The reason for this result is clear.With immediate expensing the
government is effectively subsidising investment at exactly the same rate
as it taxes profits.The cost of any project is reduced by the same
fraction as the future benefits will be reduced when taxes are levied
(assuming a constant tax rate). Given that both the benefits and costs of
the project are reduced in the same proportion, then provided the discount
rate is unaffected by the tax rate any project that was accepted in the
absence of a tax would be accepted with the tax. This result assumed that
there are always sufficient taxable profits for the tax allowances to be
used to offset current tax liabilities. Alternatively the tax system must
provide for complete loss offset by allowing tax losses to be carried
for-.ard marked up by the nominal interest rate. With this tax system the
government becomes a partner in the firm, albeit a sleeping partner (see
also King, 1975).It makes a contribution on new investment at the same
rate as it shares in the profits of the enterprise.On new marginal
investment projects the system is effectively a zero tax. But on
intra-marginal projects and on investment made prior to the introduction of
the cash flow corporate income tax, the tax acts as a capital levy on the
owners of corporate assets.
One of the great advantages of the cash flow tax is that the cost of
capital can be seen to be independent of the inflation rate without any
need to introduce complicated indexation provisions.The same cannot be
said of any tax that attempts to measure "economic profits". The only long
run problem with the cash flow tax is that there is a possible time- 19-
inconsistencyinvolved in government policy.Given that the tax has no
disincentive effects on investment but yields revenue fromthe
intra-marginal projects, the government would have an apparent incentive to
announce that the tax rate would remain at its present level butyet in the
future to go back on its word and to raise the rate of tax. In thisway it
would appear to be able to raise additional revenue fromlump sum taxes.
If this increase in the tax rate were anticipated then ofcourse the tax
would no longer be a lump sum tax and investment decisions would be
affected. In practice, the UK had a very similar tax system in force from
1973 until 1984, and no attempt was in fact made to raise the rate of tax.
Moreover, this was a period in which the administration alternated between
the two main political parties.It is possible that concern about their
reputation led governmentstoforegotheshort-run benefits of
retrospective taxation.
If we maintain the assumption of a Miller equilibrium, and turn to the
effects of other possible tax systems then, with interest deductibility,
the only system that is neutral is one which offers no accelerated
depreciation but grants ordinary depreciation allowances at rates
corresponding to true economic depreciation.These must be fully indexed
for inflation. Such was the aim of Treasury I. Since economic
depreciation is notoriously difficult to measure, such a system could only
be expected to approximate the requirements for neutrality.Morever, in
the discussions that followed the publication of Treasury I, indexation
found much less favour with Congress than with the authors of the Treasury
plans. This experience appears to support the view of the Meade Committee
(1978) which recommended a cash flow corporate income tax over a tax based
on comprehensive income partly on the grounds that the calculations
required for a measure of "economic profit" were complex and difficult to- 20-
administer.
If we relax the assumption of a Miller equilibirum, then the discount
rate for the company will reflect the tax treatment of dividends and
personal tax rates on both dividends and capital gains. There is no really
satisfactory general equilibrium model of corporate financial behaviour
outside of the simple Miller equilibrium, but if one were constructed the
marginal cost of capital would be a weighted average of the costs of
capital for the different sources of finance.The difficulty is to
identify the weights that would be used.Fewer distortions would be
expected from a tax system that discriminated less between the different
sources of finance, and as we saw in Section 3 the cash flow corporate
income tax scored well on this point.
The problem with the simple Miller equilibrium is that it contains a
clearly counterfactual prediction, namely that except for the marginal
investor all other investors would be completely specialised in either debt
or equity securities. One simple alternative is to calculate a weighted
average cost of capital using as weights the average proportion of
investment financed from different sources. Such calculations were-made for
the then existing tax system in the comparative study of King and Fullerton
(1984). To constrast the effect of a cash flow tax on the cost of capital
with that of the Treasury plans, and to compare both possible reforms with
the present system, we present below updated estimates of the effective
marginal tax rate on capital income as calculated in the King and Fullerton
study.To do this, the post-tax real rate of return to the investor
corresponding to the pre-tax rate of return on a project (the cost of
capital as defined here) is computed for each investor.Denote this




Table2 shows effective marginal tax rates for the UK and US under
several alternative tax regimes. For the UK the figures are shown for the
pre-1984 position, the new 1986 regime, and the situation that would result
if the 1986 system were converted into a cash flow corporation tax. In the
case of the US, the rates are shown for the 1984 starting point, the two
Treasury plans (I and II), and the hypothetical case of Treasury I amended
to include a pure cash flow corporate income tax but with all the personal
tax changes intact. The inflation rate assumed in the calculations is 5%
per annum.
It is clear that even without adopting a consumption tax at the
personal level, the cash flow corporate income tax eliminates many of the
more extreme distortions that are evident in the current system.
5. PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION
5.1 Transitional Arrangements
Two sets of issues arise when designing a suitable transition to the
new tax base.The first consists of the problems that arise from the
application of the new tax base. The second is the question of how far the
expected consequences of the old base are continued after the introduction
of the new tax. The second is the easier to deal with and so is considered
first.- 22-
Onthe date when the new base comes into force companies have a stock
of depreciation allowances that they expect to be able to carry forward and
deduct (in a predetermined time profile) against future taxable profits.
There seems no good reason to deny companies the right to continue to
deduct depreciation allowances on past investment. To abolish the existing
stock of depreciation allowances would be akin to a windfall profits tax in
proportion to past investment; not a happy precedent to set. Nevertheless,
the Rall-Rabushka (1983) plan did imply such an effect. Moreover, unless
the date on which the tax becomes effective can be made retrospective
anticipation of the change would lead to a collapse in investment in the
period between announcement and the date when the enabling legislation was
passed.In the UK it is possible for the government to announce that,
conditional upon the proposed legislation receiving Parliamentary approval
within a certain period, the new tax would be effective from the date of
announcement. But in the US context this seems less plausible.
Similar arguments apply to other forms of "losses" that companies had
expected to be able to carry forward to offset against future profits.
Continuation of such loss carry forwards is straightforward under the real
basis, but with the net dividends basis the simplicity of the tax would be
reduced because net distributions constitute a tax-exclusive base whereas
loss carry forwards are inherited from a tax-inclusive regime. To retain
simplicity the loss carry forwards could be converted into a stock of tax
credits (or, more generally, a flow of tax credits over time) on the
transition date.- 23-
Theother set of problems results from the implications of the new base
although their nature differs as between the real and net distributions
bases. With the former, the main problem is that debt interest payments
are no longer tax-deductible. For new debt finance this raises no problems,
but for borrowing incurred before the announcement of the new base there is
a retrospective charge on the cost of servicing the debt which in some,
perhaps many, cases could cause acute financial distress for highly geared
companies. One solution is simply to phase out interest deductibility by
reducing the proportion of interest payments that are deductible (the value
of 3 in section 3) gradually over a period of, say five to ten, years from
unity to zero. As far as the net distributions basis is concerned there is
a more serious transitional problem. Unless the new basis became effective
on the date of announcement, companies would have a strong incentive to
raise their debt-equity ratios by borrowing and paying high dividends
before the transition date, and then to issue new equity in order to repay
the loans and reduce dividends after the transition date in order to repay
the loans and restore their debt-equity ratios to normal levels.Similar
incentives existed in the UK during the major corporate tax reforms of 1965
and 1973, and although revenue losses occurred the problem was regarded as
manageable. Nevetheless, anti-avoidance provisions would be necessary
because the scope for avoidance using purely financial transactions is
large.
5.2Long-runAdministrative Problems
In this section we describe some of the administrative problems that
the tax would present on a permanent basis.The first concerns the
treatment of borrowing.Under the corporate cash flow basis only real
transactions are taken into account and profits made on financial- 24-
trasactionsare exempt from tax. This does not appear to be a satisfactory
method of taxing financial institutions. If the cash flow base were adopted
then a separate tax would be required for suchinstitutions.
Alternatively, under the net equity distributions basis, which does tax the
profits on financial transactions, rules would be required to prevent
companies from issuing debt at artificially high interest rates.Such
payments would be exempt from corporate tax and would be a method of
returning profits to the shareholders free of tax. Of course, this problem
exists under the current tax with interest deductibility.Current rules
would need to be carried over. Some of the other problems that exist with
the current corporate tax system would remain with the new tax.There
would still need to be a distinction between corporate and personal
expenditure in order to levy the appropriate amounts of personal income tax
on benefits provided by the company.Under the net equity distributions
basis new rules would be required to determine the amount of dividends that
enter the tax base when some part of the dividend was paid in kind.
Shareholder benefits of all types (for example, reductions in the price of
the company's products when sold to its shareholders) come under this
heading.
A second area of potential problems concerns the phenomenon of tax
exhaustion.This is the situation in which the company has no current
taxable income and is accumulating tax losses that will be carried forward.
A question that arises is how far it is thought to be acceptable for
companies to trade such tax losses among themselves. Under the existing
tax systems in both the US and UK trading of tax losses takes place with
leasing.The US authorities have taken a much harder line on this than
their UK counterparts, although it is not easy to see why companies should
be prevented from offsetting the unintended effects of an asymmetric tax- 25-
system.The limiting case would be to create a market incorporate tax
losses.Failing that, companies could be allowed tocarry forward losses
marked up by the market interest rate which would leavethe incentive to
invest unaffected by the asymmetric treatment ofpositive and negative
taxable profits. In the absence of such aprovision, leasing would be the
market solution under the corporate cash flow basis. Underthe net equity
distributions basis a rather different set ofcompanies would be tax
exhausted.These would be firms that had made substantial issues ofnew
shares. Such a company could reduce its tax loss byborrowing in order to
purchase shares in other resident companies, and in the absence of loss
carry forward with interest would have an incentive so to do.
Although these problems are rather different under the two alternative
bases, they do not seem to be more serious under one than the other. The
cash flow basis perhaps has a cosmetic advantage inappearing more
familiar. But the net equity distributions basis would enable therevenue
authorities to adopt a common fiscal year for all companies without the
need for companies to change their own accounting periods.
The treatment of overseas investment and profits remitted from abroad
also raises some important questions.With a cash flow corporation tax
there is no obvious reason to grant credit for foreign taxes paid. This is
because the government, as has been argued above, is apartner in the
firm's equity. If the foreign corporate tax rate is at least asgreat as
the domestic tax rate, then the government would receive no returnon its
investment in the firm's activities overseas. But if foreign tax credit is
denied then the firm receives a return on its own share of the investment
equal to the net of foreign tax rate return on the investment, i.e. the- 26-
returnto society on this investment overseas. One problem with the denial
of foreign tax credit is that it would be difficult to impute that part of
foreign taxes attributable to investment made after the introduction of the
cash flow tax and that part attributable to investment made before the
change in the system.Hence an alternative means of achieving the same
objective would be to deny investment relief for overseas investment.
Under the cash flow base this would be straightforward in that the
investment made overseas would not qualify for immediate expensing. With
the net equity distributions base, an additional tax would be levied on
overseas investment at the appropriate tax-inclusive rate.Where the
foreign tax rate was below the domestic corporate tax rate then the
additional charge (or reduction in allowances for investment) would be
scaled down in proportion to the ratio of the two tax rates.It is
interesting to note that for 12 years (1972-84) the UK government did allow
companies both to receive 100% first year allowances on overseas investment
made by branches and also to receive credit for foreign taxes paid. This
was effectively a subsidy to overseas investment. Nevertheless, it seems
unlikely that this position could be maintained if there were a permanent
shift to a cash flow corporation tax.
5.3 Revenue Implications of the Cash Flow Tax
At first sight it might appear that a tax which offers such generous
investment incentives would require a higher tax rate to raise the same
amountsofrevenue as under the current corporate tax system. A little
reflection, however, demonstrates that this is not the case. The new tax
base would imply the abolition of investment tax credits and grants, and- 27-
alsoof deductions for interest payments on new loans and fordividends. A
full-scale calculation of the tax rate that would berequired to raise the
same amount of revenue would involve a general equilibriumanalysis of the
incentive effects of the new tax. This beyond ourscope here. Instead we
report some partial equilibrium estimates of the rate that will be required
assuming no behavioural responses.
In the UK the Meade Committee (1978) found that over theperiod 1964-74
the required tax rate would have been 35% under the cash flow base and 34%
under the net equity distributions base.These figures compare with the
actual tax rate of between 40 and 45% over this period. Subsequently, the
1982 Green Paper on Corporation Tax claimed that the revenue-neutral rate
of tax for the net equity distributions basis for the period 1973-81 would
have been about 200% on a tax-exclusive basis. But Edwards (1982) showed
that this calcualtion incorrectly attributed Advance Corporation Tax
payments to the total corporate tax liability, when it is in fact more
appropriately seen as a deduction at source of income tax at the basic rate
on dividends.Making this correction he found that the revenue-neutral
rate assuming unchanged behaviour was 47% for the net equity distributions
base which compared with the actual rate of 52% that prevailed throughout
this period. Using individual company data Mayer (1982) found that for the
period 1965-76 the average rate required for revenue neutrality would have
been 52% under the cash flow base and 42% under the net equity
distributions base. All of these calculations show that there is no reason
to suppose that the tax rate would have to rise if the base were switched
to a corporate cash flow base.- 28-
Similarcalculations for the United States by Aaron and Galper (1985)
found that for the net equity distributions base a tax rate of 33% would
have raised the same revenue as was in fact raised during the period
1981-83 with a tax rate of 46%.Again there seems to reason to suppose
that a switch to a cash flow base would lead to problems of revenue loss
provided adequate transitional arrangements were made.
6. Conclusions
Recent proposals for tax reform have raised the question of how easy it
is to measure economic depreciation for the corporate sector. The effects
of any proposed reform on investment will depend upon their impact on the
cost of capital which in turn depends upon how the allowances for
depreciation built into the tax code relate to underlying true economic
depreciation. The proposals for economic depreciation embodied in Treasury
I entailed complete indexation of the corporate tax. It appears that these
proposals are unlikely to be implemented. It is worth considering,
therefore, whether there is any alternative tax base for which the cost of
capital is independent of the inflation rate and which eliminates some of
the existing distortions between different types of investment.One
possible candidate is the cash flow corporation tax. Two versions of this
tax were analysed in this paper;the cash flow base on real transactions
and the net equity distributions base. From the analysis of their effects
on investment incentives, and the administrative arrangements that would be
required for their implementation, it seems that the cash flow base is
worthy of serious consideration in the current debate on reform of
corporate taxation.- 29-
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TABLE1 CORPORATE SOURCESANDUSESOF FUNDS
SOURCES USES
RReceipts from sales of goods and I IInvestment expenditure (gross
services less purchases of labour, I investment less receipts from
raw materials and services sales of assets).
BBorrowing (new issues of debt lessPInterest payments (net of
repayments of old debt). interest received)
SNew share issues (less share i DDividends paid (less dividends
repurchases), including net sales I received)


















Machinery -35.619.812.3 8.0 37.7 24.8 19.5
Buildings 24.253.847.8 31.0 40.3 34.722.6
Inventories 41.751.212.348.2 38.8 36.0 18.9
Finance method:
Debt -61.120.846.5 -19.1 29.2 14.0 27.3
New shares -0.822.639.479.5 46.4 62.5 40.5
Retained
earnings 15.242.417.5 52.8 44.3 41.8 16.1
Overall: -0.137.424.1 29.9 39.3 31.0 21.1
Assumptions: (a) all projects earn 10% p.a. pre-tax return.
(b) inflation is 5% p.a.- 33-
APPENDIX
In this appendix we derive expressions for the nominal discountrate
that companies will use to compare net ofcorporate income tax cash flows
in different periods.The novel feature is the explicit modelling of
indexation of the tax system. The discount rate dependsupon the source of
finance that the firm uses, and can be thought of as therequired net of
tax return that the company must earn in order to be able topersuade
investors to supply finance to the company. The corporate discountrate is
denoted by p.
(i) debt finance
This is the simplest case in which the nominal discount rate issimply
the effective net of tax interest rate at which thecompany can borrow.
This is the market interest rate, i, less the tax savings for interest
payments granted at the corporate level. A fraction 3 of interest payments
are deductible against the corporate tax rate, and if such payments are




where I is an indexation dummy variable that takes the value unity when
interest payments are indexed for tax purposes and zero otherwise.- 34-
(ii)new share issues
Where new share issues are the optimal source of finance, the company
will distribute all of its profits as dividends and finance investment by
the sale of new equity. The return that the company earns net of corporate
tax (the value of p) must be such that the net of tax dividend that it can
finance is equal to the investor's opportunity cost of funds, which in turn
is equal to the net of tax interest rate that the investor can earn on
alternative investments. For an investor whose marginal income tax rate is
m this condition implies that
i-m(i-irI) (l-m)'ôp +zrI (A.2)
where I is a dummy variable that takes the value unity when capital gains
are indexed for tax purposes and is zero otherwise.
The RHS of (A2) is the net of tax dividend plus the reduction in
capital gains tax resulting from the real capital loss that arises when all
profits are distributed as dividends and capital gains tax is indexed for
inflation.This tax benefit disappears if either inflation is zero or
capital gains tax is unindexed.
Rearranging (A2) yields
(mIt -zlz)ir p——+ (A.3)
0 (l-m)0- 35-
(iii)retained earnings
In the case of retained earnings the nominal return earned by the
company, net of the investor's additional capital gains tax liability
generated by the return, must equal the investor's opportunity cost of
funds. Hence
-m(i-I)—pz(pi1z) (A.4)
Rearranging terms gives
.[l-m) +[mli-zlz]
(A.5)